Reported Simon Daniel Yusuph l journalist at wengglobal
The All Progressives Congress (APC) in Osun State has attributed its defeat in the 2026 governorship election to a combination of internal disagreements, organisational weaknesses and what party figures described as an overestimation of its electoral strength against incumbent Governor Ademola Adeleke.
The assessment has reopened a longstanding debate within the Osun APC over whether the party’s internal cohesion was strong enough to defeat an incumbent who had built a political structure around his personal popularity, grassroots mobilisation and the Adeleke family’s established influence in the state.
The August 15 governorship election was one of Nigeria’s most closely watched off-cycle contests, with Adeleke, contesting under the Accord Party, facing APC candidate Munirudeen Bola Oyebamiji and other contenders.
The APC had entered the election projecting considerable confidence. Its national leadership mobilised governors, National Assembly members, local government structures and other senior party figures for the campaign, while Oyebamiji repeatedly declared that the party had sufficient grassroots support to reclaim Osun.
The outcome, however, has prompted an internal reassessment of the party’s strategy and its handling of the contest.
The argument that internal division contributed to an APC defeat in Osun is not entirely new. The party’s political history in the state has been marked by factional disputes, disagreements between major political blocs and unresolved questions over leadership and zoning.
Indeed, months before the 2026 election, several political commentators and media reports had warned that the APC’s ability to maintain unity would be central to its chances of defeating Adeleke.
Internal Crisis Remained a Recurring Challenge
The APC’s internal difficulties in Osun predated the 2026 election by several years.
The party’s 2022 defeat against Adeleke was widely associated with divisions between supporters of former Governor Adegboyega Oyetola and the political camp of former Governor Rauf Aregbesola.
The internal conflict contributed to the fragmentation of the party’s political structure and weakened its ability to mobilise all sections of its support base behind Oyetola.
Daily Trust reported after the 2022 election that internal wrangling and dissatisfaction within the APC were among the factors that contributed to its defeat. (Daily Trust)
Similarly, Daily Independent’s post-election analysis identified factional battles, personality clashes and disagreements within the APC as major factors behind Oyetola’s defeat in 2022. The report noted that the party had struggled to reconcile competing political interests before the election. (Independent Newspaper Nigeria)
That history became an important reference point during preparations for the 2026 poll.
The Nation reported in 2025 that the APC needed to resolve its internal disagreements and organise a rancour-free process if it hoped to remove Adeleke from office. The report specifically identified disagreements over zoning and competing interests among party stakeholders as potential obstacles. (The Nation)
The Guardian similarly reported that the Osun APC had been divided between major political blocs and warned that failure to resolve the internal crisis could undermine its electoral prospects. (The Guardian Nigeria)
Those warnings are now being revisited in the wake of the party’s latest electoral setback.
The Danger of Taking an Incumbent for Granted
Beyond internal wrangling, the APC’s post-election assessment has also focused on the possibility that the party underestimated Adeleke.
The incumbent entered the election with the advantage of holding office and the ability to campaign on the record of his administration.
His political organisation also worked to portray the election as a referendum on his performance in office, repeatedly highlighting projects and programmes in infrastructure, education, healthcare, workers’ welfare and other sectors.
Before the election, Adeleke himself expressed strong confidence that he would defeat Oyebamiji.
In April, his spokesperson said the governor believed the APC was afraid of the electorate and cited alleged surveys showing support for Adeleke. The APC rejected those claims and maintained that it was capable of defeating the incumbent. (Osun State Official Website)
The APC’s confidence was equally visible.
Oyebamiji told supporters in June that he was the only candidate endorsed by President Bola Tinubu and dismissed claims that the President supported Adeleke. The APC candidate also expressed confidence in the party’s grassroots structure. (The Nation)
In July, APC campaign officials went further, expressing confidence that the party could defeat Adeleke even in Ede, the governor’s political stronghold.
The party’s Director-General, Oluwole Oke, said APC mobilisation was gaining momentum and argued that the party could surprise its opponents in areas where Adeleke traditionally enjoyed strong support. (Nigerian NewsDirect)
That confidence formed part of the broader campaign strategy. But the post-election assessment suggests that some party actors may now believe the confidence became excessive.
APC Had Earlier Projected Stronger Internal Cohesion
An important feature of the 2026 campaign was the APC’s attempt to present itself as a more united organisation than the one that contested the 2022 election.
In April, The Nation published an assessment describing the party’s internal cohesion as a potential boost to Oyebamiji’s candidacy. The report noted that more than 1,600 delegates had affirmed Oyebamiji as the party’s candidate after other aspirants stepped down. (The Nation)
The development was significant because party leaders appeared determined to avoid the prolonged internal battle that had weakened Oyetola’s campaign four years earlier.
Yet reports of disagreements within the party did not disappear completely.
In May, Osun Defender reported protests and allegations of irregularities following APC legislative primaries in several parts of the state. Some party members complained about the conduct of the exercise and accused party leaders of failing to respect internal democratic procedures. Party officials rejected some of the allegations. (Osun Defender)
Although those disputes concerned legislative primaries rather than the governorship election directly, they demonstrated that questions about internal party management remained relevant.
For a political organisation preparing for a high-stakes governorship contest, such grievances can affect morale, grassroots mobilisation and the willingness of local actors to work collectively.
The Campaign Was Built Around a Two-Horse Contest
The APC’s campaign also treated the election largely as a direct contest between Oyebamiji and Adeleke.
That assessment was understandable given the visibility of both candidates.
Vanguard reported before the election that the contest was dominated by Adeleke and Oyebamiji, although several other candidates were also on the ballot. The report noted that 14 political parties were participating in the election and that the state had more than 2.3 million registered voters. (Vanguard News)
INEC had confirmed that 2,339,233 voters were eligible to participate in the August 15 election, underscoring the scale of the electorate and the importance of grassroots organisation. (Osun Defender)
For the APC, the challenge was therefore not simply to defeat Adeleke personally but to construct a statewide coalition capable of converting political support into actual votes across 30 local government areas and 332 wards.
That requires coordination among party leaders, candidates, polling-unit agents, local organisers and grassroots supporters.
Any significant disconnect between the party’s central campaign and its local structures can affect election-day performance.
Adeleke’s Grassroots Strategy
Adeleke’s campaign, meanwhile, concentrated heavily on grassroots mobilisation.
The governor’s political team presented him as a candidate with an established relationship with voters and repeatedly argued that his administration’s projects and policies had strengthened his support base.
The campaign also sought to neutralise the APC’s emphasis on federal political power.
When APC National Chairman Nentawe Yilwatda said the party would deploy governors, lawmakers, local government chairmen and other political heavyweights to Osun, Adeleke’s campaign dismissed the strategy as insufficient to determine the choice of voters. The Guardian reported that the campaign maintained that the election would ultimately be decided by Osun residents. (The Guardian Nigeria)
That argument reflected one of the central themes of the campaign: whether the APC’s national political machinery could overcome Adeleke’s local political network.
The result has now given greater weight to questions about how much influence federal political structures can exert over an electorate with established local political loyalties.
Lessons From the 2022 Election
The APC’s current post-election analysis also inevitably recalls the lessons of 2022.
In that election, Adeleke defeated incumbent Governor Oyetola after a highly competitive contest.
The Independent reported at the time that APC factional disputes, including tensions involving Aregbesola’s political camp, weakened the party’s position. (Independent Newspaper Nigeria)
Osun Defender also quoted APC factional leaders after the election as saying they had warned that the party’s internal crisis could lead to defeat. One factional leader, Rasaq Salinsile, attributed the loss to disunity, while another party figure, Abiodun Agboola, said no organisation could enter an election divided and expect to avoid the consequences. (Osun Defender)
The similarity between that assessment and the latest criticism is significant.
It suggests that the central problem identified by some APC stakeholders is not necessarily the absence of electoral strength, but the party’s ability to convert that strength into a unified campaign.
The Question of Strategy
The APC’s latest defeat raises broader questions about political strategy in Osun.
First is the question of candidate-centred versus party-centred campaigning.
A strong candidate can attract votes beyond traditional party structures, while a strong party can provide the organisational machinery necessary to win competitive elections.
Second is the issue of political intelligence.
An effective campaign must accurately assess voter sentiment rather than rely solely on internal enthusiasm, large rallies or endorsements from political leaders.
Third is the importance of local alliances.
Osun’s political landscape is highly localised, with voting patterns influenced by senatorial districts, local government areas, traditional institutions, community networks and longstanding political relationships.
A statewide strategy therefore requires detailed understanding of those dynamics.
APC’s Challenge After the Defeat
The immediate challenge for the APC is to prevent another electoral loss from becoming another prolonged internal crisis.
Political parties routinely experience disagreements after elections. The danger arises when blame becomes a substitute for organisational reform.
If the party accepts the argument that internal wrangling contributed to its defeat, the next step would be to identify the specific disagreements that affected mobilisation and determine how they can be resolved.
The party may also need to reassess its relationship with influential political blocs in Osun, strengthen its grassroots structures and improve communication between state and national leadership.
Equally important will be the party’s approach to future candidate selection.
A transparent process that gives stakeholders confidence in the legitimacy of party decisions could reduce the likelihood of defections and internal sabotage.
What the Result Means for Adeleke
For Adeleke, the outcome represents a major political validation.
Having secured a second mandate, the governor will now face the challenge of translating electoral support into effective governance.
A victory provides political authority, but it also raises expectations.
The electorate that returned him to office will expect continued attention to infrastructure, employment, education, healthcare, workers’ welfare and economic development.
The governor will also need to govern beyond the political coalition that supported his re-election.
The strength of a democratic mandate is ultimately demonstrated by how it is used after the election.
Wengglobal Perspective
The APC’s explanation that internal wrangling and overconfidence contributed to its defeat should be treated as a political assessment rather than a definitive explanation of the election result.
Voters make electoral decisions for multiple reasons, including candidate appeal, government performance, party loyalty, local interests, campaign effectiveness, political alliances and perceptions of future governance.
It would therefore be simplistic to attribute the outcome to one factor alone.
However, the history of the Osun APC provides substantial context for the party’s current soul-searching.
The organisation has repeatedly confronted the consequences of internal divisions, from the 2018 election cycle through the 2022 defeat and into preparations for the 2026 contest.
The key question now is whether the party will treat the latest defeat as another episode in a cycle of factional disputes or use it as an opportunity for institutional reform.
For wengglobal, the broader lesson is clear: electoral strength cannot be measured only by the size of rallies, the number of political heavyweights deployed or the confidence expressed by party leaders.
Elections are ultimately decided by voters, and successful political organisations must understand the electorate, maintain credible grassroots structures, manage internal disagreements and avoid confusing organisational confidence with public support.
The APC’s post-election reflection therefore offers a significant case study in Nigerian electoral politics. A party with substantial national political influence can still lose a state-level contest if its local strategy does not sufficiently connect with voters.
As Adeleke begins another term, the APC faces the harder task of rebuilding its Osun structure, restoring internal confidence and developing a strategy that is based not on assumptions about inevitable victory but on a detailed understanding of the electorate it seeks to persuade.
Sources
- The Guardian Nigeria — reported the APC’s internal political divisions and the broader contest between the party and Adeleke ahead of the 2026 Osun election. (The Guardian Nigeria)
- The Nation — examined internal disputes within the Osun APC and warned that the party needed to resolve its differences to defeat Adeleke. (The Nation)
- The Nation — reported in April 2026 that the APC had improved internal cohesion ahead of the Osun election, providing important context for the party’s subsequent performance. (The Nation)
- Daily Trust — documented how internal wrangling contributed to the APC’s defeat in the 2022 Osun governorship election. (Daily Trust)
- Daily Independent — analysed the 2022 APC defeat and identified factional disputes and organisational weaknesses as significant factors. (Independent Newspaper Nigeria)
- Osun Defender — reported earlier warnings from APC factional leaders that internal divisions could cause electoral defeat. (Osun Defender)
- The Punch — reported the APC’s campaign strategy and its confidence in defeating Adeleke ahead of the 2026 poll. (Nigerian NewsDirect)
- The Guardian Nigeria — reported the competing campaign strategies and the APC’s deployment of political structures against Adeleke. (The Guardian Nigeria)
- Channels Television — reported heightened political tensions and security preparations ahead of the August 15 Osun governorship election. (Channels TV)
- INEC-related reporting via The Punch — reported the electoral commission’s commitment to conducting a credible poll reflecting the will of Osun voters. (Punch Newspapers)
